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Abstract 
This paper examines the political economy of development policy through the prism 
of four country case studies (Egypt, India, South Africa and Turkey) of the automotive 
industry. The objective is not simply to examine the developmental impact of 
automotive policy, but to illustrate how the policy regime has been the outcome of a 
contested process. Early growth in the auto sector in the four case countries was 
enabled by rents from protected markets. The emergence of competitive firms is 
critically dependent on the nature of state–business relationships and the net 
outcome of the rent-seeking process in the sector. This hinges on the bargaining 
power of business, foreign or domestic, vis à vis the government. If firms capture 
subsidies in return for support to weak and vulnerable ruling coalitions, the auto 
sector in that country can become the classic case of an infant industry remaining 
stunted. Where the distribution of power is such that ruling coalitions are able to 
discipline firms in the auto sector, so that they become globally competitive, 
developmental outcomes have been positive.  
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List of abbreviations 
 
APDP   Automotive Production and Development Programme 
CBU   Completely built up 
CKD    Completely knocked down 
COMESA                    Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
CU   Customs union 
FDI              Foreign direct investment 
ECA   Egyptian Customs Authority 
FYDP    Five-year development plan 
HM   Hindustan Motors 
HS   Harmonised commodity description and coding systems 
IAMP                          Indian Auto Mission Plan 
ISI    Import substituting industrialisation 
GAFTA                       Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement 
MFN   Most favoured nation 
MIDP   Motor Industry Development Programme  
MNC   Multinational corporation 
NAACAM   National Association of Automotive Component and Allied  
    Manufacturers 
NAAMSA  National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South 
    Africa 
NATRIP  National Automotive Testing and R&D Infrastructure Project 
OEM   Original equipment manufacturer (vehicle producer) 
OICA   International Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
PC   Policies Committee  
PCF   Politically connected firm 
R&D   Research and development 
WTO    World Trade Organisation 
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1. Introduction: The political economy of automotive industry 
development in developing countries 
The automotive industry is one of the world’s largest manufacturing sectors and has 
played a key role in national development in many countries. Apart from its size and 
associated economic impact, the industry comprises a variety of industrial processes 
and has many spin-offs for other sectors. It has frequently been seen as emblematic 
of industrial development and has been the recipient of significant state support. This 
paper examines the sectoral political economy, with special emphasis on historically 
informed country case studies that elucidate the state–business relations in the 
sector or, more specifically, the politically transacted interactions between 
governments and domestic and international firms.   
 
The strategic importance of the sector, through its potential to attract high quality FDI 
and generate domestic employment, gave the state the latitude to provide subsidy- 
induced rents to large capitalists by providing high levels of protection in pre-WTO 
days. In many cases, however, governments had limited capacity to discipline the 
rents the sector received. In other words, the subsidies got captured, leading to huge 
X inefficiencies in the sector. This protectionist phase, which lasted from the 1960s to 
the 1980s, was then usually followed by significant opening to trade, mainly aimed at 
developing exports. More recently, and as a development related to liberalisation, 
state–business relations in the sector have moved from domestic political economy-
determined to being determined by the relative bargaining power of international auto 
firms and domestic auto component manufacturers in the global value chain. What is 
clear, also, is that there is limited space for indigenous domestic auto firms to emerge 
– albeit with important exceptions, such as India and China. 
  
The issues at stake here are domestic policy and the development of domestic 
capabilities. Related to this is the nature of state–business relationships or patron–
client networks in the sector. This is closely linked to the distribution of power among 
the various stakeholders, including ruling political coalitions, domestic firms and 
multinational firms. Sometimes the outcomes of political networks and linkages can 
have a deep effect on industry composition and its potential for growth. For instance, 
lobbying by politically connected capitalists in a developing country could lead to high 
effective rates of protection for assembly, with negligible support for the component 
sector. This is likely to ensure that the country does not develop a components 
industry, but remains an assembly hub. Given that the bulk of value added within the 
sector lies with the production of components,1 an assembly-only outcome severely 
constrains the prospects for the sector. A strong supplier industry is also a major 
factor in encouraging further assembly investments. But promoting the auto and auto 
component sectors at the same time can be tricky. The auto assembly sector would 
naturally prefer lower tariffs on components and the component sector would prefer 
higher tariffs on imported parts or local content requirements. The handful of 
developing countries that have developed successful indigenous auto industries have 
 
1 This varies according to the type of vehicle, but can be as high as 80 percent.   
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done so by developing both ‘home-grown’ auto and auto component firms. Of course, 
the success of this depends on historical institutionalist as well as political economy 
factors and this paper attempts to outline these for each of our case study countries. 
 
The objective of this paper, therefore, is not simply to examine the developmental 
impact of automotive policy, but to illustrate how the policy regime has been the 
outcome of a contested and frequently conflicted process. We have chosen our case 
study countries – India, Turkey, South Africa and Egypt – based not just on the 
outcomes of the auto sectors in each country, but also in order to highlight how 
relatively similar policies of state-induced industrialisation and specific packages for 
the sector had differing outcomes. Our analysis points to the ability (or not) of ruling 
coalitions to discipline capitalists, who received the subsidies, to produce results, as 
well as the evolution of a credible domestic market, as reasons for these differing 
outcomes. Success in each of these criteria resulted in the development of a 
successful auto industry, the benchmark for which we hold as upgrading and 
improving their technological capabilities. This includes becoming competitive 
internationally and developing successful export markets. India achieved this through 
historic capability building from the 1980s, despite initial failures, even creating an 
auto sector based not just on FDI, but including ‘homegrown’ companies. Turkey’s 
trade deal with the EU helped it ‘bootstrap’ via FDI as a destination for export-based 
manufacturing. South Africa had developed a relatively successful FDI-based auto 
industry, but the lack of import demand from the rest of the African market and the 
inability of domestic component makers to upgrade has led to stagnation relative to 
earlier growth. The underwhelming performance of the auto sector in Egypt was the 
result of capitalists with close links to the military capturing subsidies meant for the 
sector. Hence, as we outline later, despite extensive and sometimes similar state-
backed policies, the evidence from each of our countries points to a critical link 
between the kinds of policies and the ability to implement them in their political 
economy contexts. Just ‘getting the policies right’ is not enough to ensure sectoral 
success, which depends also on the disciplining capabilities of ruling coalitions, the 
capabilities of entrepreneurs in the sector and the size of the domestic market.  
 
For some developing countries, the impact of globalisation has been very positive 
with the auto sector being elevated to a new level as a regional production hub, 
characterised by growing investment, expanded production and exports and 
widespread industrial upgrading. Successful countries have emerged as global or 
regional hubs and include, for example, Mexico in North America and Thailand in 
south east Asia. In Europe there are a number of contenders. Slovakia has the 
highest per capita car production in the world. Turkey is also an important regional 
centre. Much less important, but of growing significance, is Morocco, which now 
hosts Africa’s biggest car assembly plant (Benabedjil et al., 2015). But these 
countries compete with large incentives and attracting large investments may come 
at a high price. Lower wages with historically moderately high levels of capability 
development are also a factor. These positive outcomes may, however, be tempered 
by a decline in local ownership and the downgrading of capabilities at domestically 
owned firms. In other circumstances, national clusters comprising foreign and 
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domestically owned firms can be relegated to the periphery of regional and global 
automotive networks. In these circumstances, the industry may impose a costly 
burden to the country concerned and there are a number of cases of outright failure 
of the sector, for instance in Pakistan, Nigeria and Colombia.  
 
Competitive advantages are, in part, a reflection of these investments, rather than the 
innate characteristics of these countries. For example, Thailand and Malaysia share 
many common features, but Thailand has emerged as the major producer in the 
region. The higher level of investments in Thailand is also the result of political 
economy factors like rent capture in Malaysia’s auto industry which stymied the 
growth of an indigenous auto sector that could have developed via the state-owned 
Proton car company. The existence of a favoured indigenous firm in Malaysia also 
served to deter MNC investment.  
 
Successful development policy in the auto sector requires three interconnected 
attributes (Humphrey and Oeter, 2000; Black, 2009). Firstly, it is essential to define a 
regional or national ‘automotive space’,2 which needs to be protected – at least over 
the short to medium term. This implies a domestic or regional market which is large 
enough to achieve efficient scale economies for vehicle producers and their 
component manufacturers. Second, effective policy needs to ensure the domestic 
industry is competitive at the sector level. This refers to both specific automotive 
policies, for instance tariffs and other incentives, as well as the provision of key public 
goods, ranging from infrastructure to training and R&D. Thirdly, the firms themselves 
have to upgrade capabilities through appropriate investments in equipment, supplier 
development and the effective management of technology and advanced forms of 
work organisation.  
 
Of these aforementioned attributes, the first two are closely linked to the enforcement 
capability of incumbent governments or the ability to discipline firms that are 
receiving subsidies to ensure that they ‘grow up’. The third variable has a bearing 
only after competitive auto firms have developed, which are then subject to global 
competitive compulsions ensuring their profitability. The emergence of competitive 
firms is critically dependent on the nature of state–business relationships and the net 
outcome of the rent-seeking process in the sector. This hinges on the bargaining 
power of business, foreign or domestic, vis à vis the government. If firms capture 
subsidies in return for support to weak and vulnerable ruling coalitions, the auto 
sector in that country can become the classic case of an infant industry remaining 
stunted. Egypt is a case in point, as was India in the early years of the development 
of its auto sector. Even in the context of rent seeking, however, where the distribution 
of power is such that ruling coalitions are able to discipline firms in the auto sector so 
that they become globally competitive, developmental outcomes have been positive.  
 
2 See also Lung and van Tulder (2004), for what constitutes a viable automobile space.  
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The requirements of scale mean that auto firms either have to heavily capture 
subsidies or be globally competitive in order to survive. Given the global nature of the 
auto supply chain, subsidy-dependent auto sectors will ensure the country does not 
develop a successful domestic sector, though politically connected ‘client’ firms in 
such settings may well benefit. It is this variable of firms being able to develop their 
own competitive capabilities that provides the credible commitment required for a 
successful auto sector and also determines the successful developmental features of 
the sector. This has to be marked by low levels of rent capture.  
It is important to note the positive role that rents have played in the sector, whether 
policy induced (like the customs union of the EU), or discretionary, like access to low-
cost finance to the sector in China or relatively easy and cheap land acquisition in 
India. The rents themselves are not the issue. What is crucial though is the 
distribution of power with regard to the sector in each of our case study countries that 
have allowed these rents to be used for developmental outcomes and to enhance 
social welfare; and equally how this distribution of power did not lead to the desired 
developmental outcomes.  
The format is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the auto industry in 
emerging markets, with some contextualisation of the four case study countries. 
Section 3 divides the trajectory of the auto sector in each of our case study countries 
based on the phases of protectionism and liberalisation. The nature of state–
business relations in each of the cases provides the context for the eventual 
outcomes in the sectors. Section 4 concludes by extracting the key implications from 
the country cases.  
2. The auto industry in Egypt, India, South Africa and Turkey: An 
overview  
Our four case countries are extremely diverse. India is of course the largest producer 
among our comparator countries, followed by Turkey, South Africa and Egypt (Table 
1). India and Turkey have shown large increases in production, while South Africa 
and Egypt have lagged. All countries have a long history in the sector and have 
attached significant importance to its development. Import substitution policies were 
pursued in all cases and included local content requirements, which were most 
stringently applied in India. Over the last 20 years, all countries have liberalised to 
some degree, although India still maintains a 100 percent tariff on imported cars. 
Applied average MFN tariffs for cars are 40 percent in Egypt, 25 percent in South 
Africa and 12.9 percent in Turkey (Table 2). Egypt maintains high average tariffs of 
54.4 percent on commercial vehicles, but they are much lower in the other countries.   
 
Another key indicator has been exports and imports. All countries except for Egypt 
are major exporters and have shown rapid export growth. Imports have grown rapidly 
in all countries, but only India runs a large trade surplus in the sector. In Turkey and 
South Africa, there is an approximate balance. 
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Table 1: Market size and production in comparator countries (2015)    
 Egypt India South 
Africa 
Turkey 
Population (million)  92 1,311 54 79 
GNI per capita ($)  3,346 1,590 6,080 9,950 
Total number of vehicles 
in operation (million) 
5.1 28.0 11.7 14.4 
Estimated ratio of people 
to vehicles 
17.5 46.3 4.6 5.3 
Passenger vehicle 
production  
12,000 3,378,003 341,025 791,027 
Passenger vehicle sales  258,400 2,772,745 412,670 725,596 
Light commercial vehicle 
production  
None 427,234 242,974 516,011 
Truck and bus production 24,000 320,447 31,659 51,758 
Commercial vehicle sales  73,700 652,591 204,978 285,598 
Exports ($ bn) 0.1 14.1 9.2 17.5 
Imports ($ bn) 6.3 4.9 7.2 17.5 
Sources: UN; World Development Indicators; OICA, export-import figures based on 
trade in vehicles other than railways and tramways from UN Comtrade. 
The development of the industry in Egypt has been characterised by a lack of clear 
long-term strategy, with policy frequently accommodating well connected local 
business interests, many of whom have lacked a long-term commitment to the 
development of the sector. Foreign ownership has been quite limited. Decades of 
protectionism in a small-scale industry have left the country’s automotive sector 
under-developed and largely incapable of competing internationally. Domestic firms 
have worked hard to erect new non-tariff trade barriers to obstruct the 
implementation of Egypt’s Euro Mediterranean Free Trade (‘Euro-Med’) Agreement 
with the EU, which obligates Egypt to remove its tariffs completely on automotive 
imports from Europe.  
 
In India, the sector had a bleak start after independence in 1947, but the country has 
since emerged as the world’s fifth largest producer of passenger cars and 
commercial vehicles. The sector is markedly different from the auto sector in other 
emerging economies (apart from China), in that while it has received investments 
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from large international OEMs, it also has large and profitable domestic auto makers 
in the passenger car, commercial vehicle and motor cycle sectors.  
 
Table 2: Applied MFN tariffs in comparator countries, 2016   
Product category HS code Applied MFN Tariffs 
Average ad valorem duties 
CBU/assembly 
tariffs 
 
Egypt India South 
Africa 
Turkey 
Buses HS 8702 40.0 19.4 25.0 12.9 
Cars HS 8703 40.0 100.0 25.0 9.7 
Commercial 
Vehicles 
HS 8704 54.4 11.8 25.0 12.1 
CKD tariffs HS 8707 5.0 6.3 20.0 4.5 
Motorcycles HS 8711 20.0 100.0 0.0 6.7 
Selected 
components 
      
Brake pads HS 
870830 
10.0 35.0 14.5 4.0 
Elec. Wipers HS 
851240 
5.0 10.0 15.0 2.7 
Tyres HS 
401110 
20.0 20.0 30.0 4.5 
Radiators HS 
870891 
7.5 10.0 12.5 3.9 
Windscreen HS 
700721 
10.0 20.0 22.5 3.0 
Note: Tariffs in South Africa can be offset with Production Rebate Credit Certificates 
(PRCCs).  
Source: WTO Tariff Database, 2016. 
South Africa also has a history of high tariffs and local content requirements. In the 
late 1980s, levels of foreign ownership were quite low, among both vehicle 
manufacturers and component producers. This changed following the democratic 
transition in 1994 and was also driven by rapid liberalisation, especially following the 
introduction of the Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) in 1995. This has 
led to much greater levels of international integration, with both exports and imports 
rising sharply.  
Heavy protection in Turkey has been followed by quite rapid liberalisation through its 
customs union agreement with the EU. This has worked out well for the country, in 
the sense that a long history in auto production, a large and growing domestic 
market, together with a phased downscaling of protection, allowed it to integrate into 
global production networks on favourable terms. The industry is currently one of the 
largest manufacturing sectors in Turkey and the leading exporter. A number of 
assemblers operate as joint ventures between multinational and domestic firms.    
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3. The development of the auto industry in the case study countries 
This section focuses on the two main phases in the development trajectory of the 
auto sector in each of our four countries. The first sub-section deals with the 
protectionist years. The second sub-section focuses on the opening up of the sector, 
whether through WTO-based liberalisation, integration into regional trade deals or a 
combination of the two. All our case study countries experienced a significant 
liberalisation of tariffs and varying degrees of integration shock. Even in this phase, 
two kinds of rents, both policy-induced and discretionary, continued to have a 
significant effect on the sector. Liberalisation has mostly resulted in the demise of the 
indigenous auto sector, except in the case of India, but has nonetheless resulted in 
some significant capability development in all the other cases, except for Egypt. 
3.1. The protectionist years: Discretionary rents and varying levels of 
compulsion 
As outlined earlier, the initial phase of development in the auto sector involved high 
levels of protection, mainly externally through high tariff barriers and sometimes even 
internally usually through providing sector permits to only a few politically well 
connected firms. While the tariffs created rents by providing a protected market, the 
discretionary rents, which provided either licences, access to land or cheap finance, 
were important in determining the success of the sector. Protection was usually 
demanded by these capitalists, or even from powerful factions from within 
governments, in the case of state-owned sectors. This ensured a high potential for 
rent capture. As a result, a significant number of developing countries were not able 
to ‘enforce’ the required discipline on the sector. 
  
Egypt: State ownership and structural adjustment. The Egyptian industry has a 
history of protection. Beginning in 1961, all automotive sector production was 
monopolised by the state-run El Nasr Automotive Manufacturing Company (NASCO), 
as part of the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policy adopted following the 
1952 revolution. The policy sought self-sufficiency, producing enough vehicles to 
serve Egypt’s small domestic market, but did not extend to developing exports. 
NASCO continued its operation during the early years of the Sadat era, remaining 
the sole vehicle assembler in Egypt between 1973 and 1977 (American Chamber of 
Commerce in Egypt, 2011). 
 
The sector was able to insulate itself from successive waves of liberalisation in both 
the 1970s and 1990s, through the preservation of high tariffs on imports of 
completely built up (CBU) vehicles, local content requirements and the extension of 
licences for joint-venture operations between multinationals and domestic interests. 
During the 1970s, these policies were motivated by the state’s desire to maintain 
control over key swathes of the manufacturing sector following Egypt’s 1973 war with 
Israel and the expansion of the country’s military–industrial complex. In the 1990s, 
protectionism served the interests of a small group of politically connected firms 
(PCFs) in the private sector that – following Egypt’s 1980 peace treaty with Israel and 
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the marginalisation of the military from political life during the Mubarak years – had 
become more influential in both political and economic decision making.   
 
Table 3: Summary of developments during the protectionist phase  
 Policy measures 
undertaken 
Political economy Outcomes 
Egypt State ownership and 
heavy protection from 
early 1960s.  
 
Limited liberalisation, 
but auto sector retains 
protection.  
Some privatisation 
(1980s). 
Nasser – state 
ownership and central 
planning.   
 
Sadat – open door 
policy and later 
structural adjustment.  
Inefficient low volume 
assembly with local 
content maintained 
through protection.  
India High protection on 
vehicles and parts; 
licensing of assembly 
firms (1960 to 1980). 
 
Support for Maruti 
investment (1980s). 
Central planning, 
indigenisation and 
import substitution.  
 
 
State overrides 
objections of existing 
firms, but insists on 
high local content in 
Maruti.   
Small-scale production 
of low-quality 
expensive cars. High 
levels of local content 
develop domestic 
capabilities. 
Maruti Suzuki 
dominates domestic 
market and develops 
large-scale supply 
base.  
South 
Africa  
High protection and 
medium local content 
requirements. 
 
Liberalisation starts 
with introduction of 
MIDP. 
Inward focus by 
apartheid government. 
 
Democratisation and 
trade liberalisation.   
Low volume assembly 
of multiple models in 
small volumes.  
Industry under foreign 
ownership. Rapid 
international 
integration. 
Turkey Import substitution. 
(1970s) 
Shift to export-oriented 
growth from 1980, but  
little success in auto 
industry; more 
successful in labour-
intensive industries, 
such as clothing and 
textiles. 
 
 
 
Prospects of CU with 
EU. 
 
Successful 
macroeconomic 
stabilisation package.  
 
Low but growing 
output, with significant 
role by joint ventures 
in assembly industry.   
Growing imports force 
car companies to 
invest. 
 
 
The political economy of automotive industry development policy in middle income countries: 
A comparative analysis of Egypt, India, South Africa and Turkey  
 
12 
 
Despite the lifting of bans on the direct import of foreign CBU vehicles, raw materials 
and spare parts in 1974, high tariffs on both vehicles and components ranged 
upwards of 135 percent.  And so, despite Sadat’s ‘Open Door’ Policy, ISI policies 
remained in place in a hybrid model of partial liberalisation (Waterbury 1983; African 
Development Bank, 2000; Loewe, 2013; El-Haddad, 2015). Local content 
requirements were set at 45 percent. Once this target was met, local assemblers 
enjoyed customs exemptions for imported components, which encouraged several 
foreign companies to enter the Egyptian market. As a result, after 1977 Egyptian 
assemblers that met local content requirements for locally produced components 
were granted custom exemptions on imported components and were allowed to 
establish joint ventures with foreign brands that could then be attracted to access the 
Egyptian market. Many of these domestic firms –in particular, GB Auto and the 
Mansour Automotive Company – were politically connected firms (PCFs) that 
possessed patronage ties to the Sadat government. As a result, during this initial 
phase of liberalisation, strong ties formed between Egyptian assemblers, 
components’ firms and foreign brands.  
 
Declining oil prices and economic mismanagement led to a gathering economic crisis 
by the late 1980s and forced the government into a second phase of liberalisation in 
the form of the IMF-imposed Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program 
(ERSAP). Starting in 1991, price, interest-rate and capital-transfer controls were 
eased or removed. PCFs in the industry continued to secure sustained 
implementation of high tariffs on imports of CBU vehicles, while expanding the right 
of foreign brands to procure joint venture licences to establish local assembly 
operations in partnership with domestic firms, thereby crowding out the influence of 
the state-run NASCO corporation. The latter was partially privatised following the 
passing of Law 203 in 1991. 
 
Following Egypt’s 1995 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), industry 
stakeholders and PCFs became increasingly fearful of a new wave of liberalisation 
threatening their position within the industry. Such apprehensions pressed Egyptian 
business interests to push for additional protection, such as Presidential Decree 429 
enacted in 2000. 3  The law applied additional customs duties on imported 
components for firms which failed to reach local content requirements.  
 
After 2004, tax and customs tariffs were simplified and reduced. But whilst relatively 
significant trade policy shifts occurred, there were only minor modifications to pricing 
and subsidy policies in the automotive sector (El-Haddad et al., 2017; Loewe 2013). 
In line with Egypt’s WTO commitments, tariffs were cut to 40 percent, except for 
vehicles with engines greater than 2000cc. Tariffs on trucks and components were 
also reduced. Nevertheless, effective rates of protection on assembly remained high. 
In 2004, there were no less than 29 assemblers of cars and commercial vehicles in 
Egypt. Given the modest size of the Egyptian market and very limited exports, this 
meant that volumes were extremely low, with no scope for the competitive 
 
3 Which amended and supersedes previous presidential decrees 351/1986 and 304/1989.  
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manufacture of parts. However, the component industry continued to be protected by 
local content provisions, particularly Presidential Decree 429.  However, a wave of 
cheap imports beginning in 2004 would undermine the position of the industry.   
 
India: The early years and the launch of the Maruti 800.  India had little capability 
in auto production at the time of independence in 1947. There were some joint 
venture initiatives with foreign companies in the passenger car segment, with 
Hindustan Motors (HM) producing cars in association with General Motors and 
Premier Ltd with Fiat. Neither of these survive in the contemporary Indian market.  
 
By the mid-1950s, India had decided to adopt the model of a centrally planned 
economy based on indigenisation and import substitution. The Indian Tariff 
commission of 1957 discouraged auto and spare parts imports, by imposing very 
high duties. Production was also severely restricted with industrial licences being 
provided for production, usually to politically connected firms. Protectionist policies in 
this period proved to be a mixed bag, with some policies encouraging learning and 
others stymieing growth. Growth in the sector at this time, especially in the 
passenger car segment, was driven not by upgrading and learning, but by the 
capture of the licences and protection from international competition.  
 
HM, which was owned by the business house of the Birlas, and Premier owned by 
industrialist Walchand Hirachand, were both close to different factions of the ruling 
Congress Party and the protection benefited them immensely. By the 1960s, India 
was producing 40,000 vehicles annually, but these were of very low quality and 
hugely expensive. The protected sector became an oligopolistic market, with very 
little pressure to improve productivity, as politically connected auto firms knew the 
duration of protection was likely to last a significant period. Despite this, however, the 
announcement of the ‘progressive manufacturing obligation’ in 1953 by the 
government to promote indigenisation in manufacturing in the sector did lead to 
indigenisation levels of 80 percent by 1970.  
 
By the 1980s, the southern state of Tamil Nadu had also developed an auto 
components sector that managed to grow, despite these strictures. This was largely 
due to the presence of companies like the TVS Group and Rane, which were 
supplying to a large auto cluster producing tractors and commercial vehicles. These 
component companies developed due to a specific configuration of business–
government relationships based on close political links between local entrepreneurs 
and key central ministers from the state in Delhi during the licence permit period 
(Roy, 2013). However, even by the mid-1970s, there was no indication that India 
would emerge as a global small car hub and leading vehicle manufacturer at the 
beginning of the 21st century. The domestic sector essentially consisted of one auto 
maker, Hindustan Motors (HM), which belonged to the politically connected Birla 
family. It required a significant break in the status quo of prevailing state–business 
relationships for this to happen. 
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The auto sector was targeted for modernisation by government policy in 1980 and 
this culminated in the formation of a joint venture between Maruti Udyog, a public 
sector company, and Suzuki from Japan, which was then mainly a motorcycle 
manufacturing company. A number of larger international auto players had been 
approached by the Indian government, but none accepted. Suzuki, however, sensed 
an opportunity in the ex-post rents that could be derived from the protected domestic 
market.  
 
The initiative was also given complete support by the Indian government, because 
this was a ‘pet’ project of the then prime minister’s younger son. This meant elite 
interests were summarily overlooked, despite the strong political connections of the 
local business families, who were the car manufacturers and the small engineering 
(auto components) lobby that was powerful locally in Delhi, where the plant was to be 
located.  
 
Equally, the foreign investor was compelled to be productive, as it had no links with 
the domestic political economy and therefore had to deliver results. According to 
Khan (2011), this combination led to an ‘incentive compatible’ financing arrangement 
that did not require the strong centralised bureaucracies needed to monitor and 
enforce industrial policy subsidies. Given the relatively weak enforcement capacities 
of the Indian state, the fact that both the incentive and compulsion to upgrade and be 
profitable were organically part of the financing arrangement, rather than requiring 
state intervention, ensured its success.  
 
An example of how successful this arrangement was, can be gauged by the fact that 
the government had asked Suzuki to ensure 70 percent non-company value addition, 
of which 60 percent had to be locally sourced. In response, the Japanese company 
trained local auto component manufacturers to come up to speed with its own quality 
requirements for components. By the 1990s, Suzuki had captured 70 percent of the 
domestic market in India, effectively side-lining the hoary Ambassador car that was 
the mainstay of Indian roads. The company (now called Maruti Suzuki) had also 
helped foster a significant supply cluster in the region around Delhi.   
 
South Africa: The protection phase and the Motor Industry Development 
Programme. The early development of the South African industry was fundamentally 
shaped by protection. High tariffs were placed on built-up vehicles, which when 
combined with a rapidly growing market, acted as a magnet to a large number of 
(initially foreign) companies, which established assembly plants in the country, 
frequently in the form of joint ventures with local firms. These operations, although in 
many cases highly profitable, were very small in international terms, with 
correspondingly high unit costs. Production was aimed solely at the domestic market. 
In line with prevailing import substitution policies, the first in a series of local content 
programmes was introduced in 1961. Net local content rose rapidly, reaching 
approximately 52 percent by mass by 1971, which marked the end of Phase II of the 
programme. In later phases, the local content requirement (on a mass basis) was 
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raised to 66 percent. In all these developments the main motivating factor for 
increasing local content remained the desire to save foreign exchange. By late 1986, 
there were seven assemblers producing over 20 basic model variants for a market of 
only 172,000 passenger cars. These low volumes meant that the industry was 
uncompetitive. Exports were minimal, but there had been substantial development of 
a domestic supplier industry.  
The Phase VI local content programme, introduced in 1989, marked a significant 
change in direction, by allowing exports to count as local content. Many component 
suppliers and all the assemblers instituted significant export drives. From an early 
stage, therefore, the vehicle producers played a key role in the export of 
components, by providing access for suppliers into their global network. The level of 
protection on built-up vehicles, however, remained prohibitive, with nominal 
protection of 115 percent (100 percent ad valorem plus 15 percent surcharge).  
Phase VI came in for heavy criticism, with frequent changes adding to the 
atmosphere of uncertainty (Black, 1994). In particular, there was pressure from the 
component producer federation, NAACAM, who were concerned about rising import 
competition. For its part, government made it clear that tariffs had to be reduced in 
line with WTO obligations. While all stakeholders were able to agree on the basic 
architecture, there were protracted and sometimes acrimonious discussions on the 
actual levels of these policy parameters, such as the extent of the duty phase down 
for vehicles and components. The most contentious issue was whether to introduce 
specific industrial policy measures to encourage higher model volumes. Due to 
intense lobbying pressure from the assemblers, this was not accepted by 
government.  
The first democratic elections in 1994 were followed by the introduction of the Motor 
Industry Development Programme (MIDP) in 1995. The MIDP continued the direction 
taken by Phase VI and entrenched the principle of import-export complementation. 
However, it went a step further, by abolishing local content requirements and 
introducing a tariff phase down at a steeper rate than required by the terms of South 
Africa’s offer to the GATT. South Africa was opening up to the world and tariffs were 
being liberalised across the board. In the auto sector, import-export complementation 
enabled assemblers to use credits earned by exporting to offset duties on imported 
components. Thus, declining nominal protection on vehicles was to a large extent 
being compensated for by reduced protection for components, again as a result of 
strong pressure by vehicle producers, all of which were either foreign owned or with 
licence agreements with MNCs.  
The MIDP was devised as a trade facilitating measure, with very particular industry 
policy objectives. With the proliferation of makes and models being produced in low 
volumes in South Africa, component firms had in turn been required to produce at 
way below minimum efficient scale. So a key objective of the MIDP was to increase 
the volume and scale of production, through a greater level of specialisation in terms 
of both vehicle models and components. This was partly successful, but nevertheless 
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levels of local content in domestically assembled vehicles declined slightly, as a 
result of the effective decline in protection on the component sector.  
Turkey: ISI and the shift to export-oriented policies in the 1980s. The automotive 
industry has been a showcase of import-substituting policies in Turkey since the late 
1960s. It was identified as an engine for growth and strongly promoted in the First 
Five Year Development Plan (FYDP) from 1963 to 1967 (Yucel, 2015). The 
government wanted to ensure that firms, which were mainly assembling vehicles 
from imported parts, would increase domestic content.  This was a key objective of 
the Assembly Industry Order of April 1964. Turkish automotive companies were 
jointly owned and managed by domestic investors and MNCs and produced poor 
quality products with outdated technology.  
 
Industrialists as an interest group have heavily influenced the trade and industrial 
policymaking process in Turkey since the 1970s. Even after the country decided to 
move from an import-substituting strategy towards an export-oriented growth strategy 
in 1980, key import-competing sectors were able to slow down the trade liberalisation 
process using their influence on policymakers.    
 
In January 1980, the Demirel government announced a new macroeconomic 
stabilisation package. Turkey finally decided to take the route that had been 
suggested by the IMF and the World Bank in the late 1970s and abandoned failed 
import-substituting policies, replacing them with an export-oriented growth strategy. 
The prevailing political atmosphere impeded implementation of the macroeconomic 
stabilisation package, but in September 1980, the military overthrew the elected 
government and took power. They supported the economic policies of the Demirel 
government and these developments ensured not only the implementation of the 
macroeconomic stabilisation package, but also the new export-oriented growth 
strategy. The strategy had two main pillars.  The first was export subsidies; the 
second was to gradually liberalise imports (Togan 1994).  
 
The increase in automotive imports in the first half of the 1990s forced the automotive 
manufacturers to undertake new investments and transfer production technology. 
Quality improvements helped exports of domestically produced cars, light 
commercials and parts approach the $1 billion mark by 1996. Despite this increase, 
the trade deficit for the industry reached an all-time high of $1.6 billion in the same 
year.  
 
Along with the steadily increasing imports, total output increased from 146,000 units 
in 1989 to 453,000 in 1993. Even though the 1994 crisis took a heavy toll on output, 
the industry was able to attract FDI, perhaps thanks to the Turkish aspirations to 
become a member of the EU and the finalisation of the CU agreement.  Interestingly, 
the presence of a bureaucracy biased towards the protection of domestic firms 
worked as a level of informal compulsion in the Turkish auto sector.  
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At the time of the CU agreement, the Turkish investment environment was not a level 
playing field for all investors. Foreign investors found it quite difficult to effectively 
operate within the bureaucracy, which was at least covertly nationalistic, as well as 
capable. Politically connected domestic firms could provide the ‘protection’ that 
MNCs needed in their interaction with the local bureaucracy. This led multinationals 
to take a domestic partner which could assist in minimising bureaucratic barriers to 
entry. All automotive firms that were in operation in 1996 were joint ventures of 
foreign MNCs with domestic partners.  
 
Comparative assessment. This first phase of policies to foster the auto sector was 
protectionist across all our comparator countries. Also notable were the levels of 
discretion provided to large capitalists or factions within the ruling coalitions that were 
in charge of the state-owned auto companies. As mentioned previously, discretionary 
rents can also be formal and legal. However, they are usually granted to those with 
strong political links. This is true especially of the Indian and Egyptian cases. The 
closer and more collusive the connection (for instance, political support or funding in 
return for discretionary rents), the greater was the discretion. For instance, in Egypt’s 
case, NASCO was an important source of rents for the military in the later 
protectionist period.   
 
The net outcome of such rents is not always negative. At least in the case of South 
Africa, India and Turkey, these policy rents led to levels of capability development 
that allowed their respective auto sectors to withstand the global integration during 
the later liberalisation phase. This was linked directly to the level of compulsion that 
ruling coalitions were able to enforce on the auto firms, as well as the technological 
capability of the entrepreneurs.  
 
Most of the auto firms in our case study countries had moderate levels of capability 
alongside maintaining close links to powerful factions within ruling coalitions. As a 
result, with the exception of Egypt, they were able to develop at least second 
generation capabilities in the sector, though there was little innovation in design and 
development. The compulsion to innovate that was apparent in the benchmark 
developmental state model best exemplified by South Korea and Taiwan was absent, 
given the weakness of the ruling coalitions in our case study countries when 
compared to the former group. This limited the development of the sector, but 
nonetheless allowed for moderate capability development, with Egypt lagging the 
most in this respect. 
 
With regard to capability development in each of the phases, the Turkish auto 
industry was most successful, in large part helped by the compulsions of decreased 
protection, due to the customs union. The players who were more serious upgraded 
their capabilities in order to stay competitive, even though post the customs union 
most of the Turkish players operated as joint ventures. In the South African case, 
apartheid turned out to be the explanatory variable for the downturn in the 
productivity growth of the industry. However, policies to encourage FDI in the post-
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apartheid years were successful, as they built on the existing capabilities of the 
sector.  
 
In the case of both India and Egypt, the collusive state–business relations did not set 
up the industry for capability development. There was no attempt at disciplining and 
the competitive compulsion in the Indian auto sector only emerged after the Suzuki 
joint venture was set up. However, the initial years of protection had led to the 
development of some capability in the sector that Suzuki could make use of. The 
counterfactual in the Egyptian case is what the trajectory of the sector could have 
been if some exogenous variable (like becoming part of a customs union or the entry 
of a significant and capable player like Suzuki in a protected market) had been a 
contributory factor. The impending future opening up of the sector comes at a time 
when the country will be unable to protect its (uncompetitive) domestic industry, 
unlike in the case of India, where the auto sector was able to move towards the 
competitiveness frontier before it joined the WTO. 
3.2. The liberalisation years: Discretionary rents gradually replaced by formal 
lobbying 
The liberalisation phase started in some countries in the 1980s and in others in the 
1990s. A more open international trade architecture was spurring auto companies 
from developed countries to expand manufacturing bases in developing countries to 
service increasing demand and make use of lowercost labour. Countries which had 
been able to develop a moderate level of capabilities in the sector managed to attract 
FDI and develop exports. The development of indigenous auto industries, however, 
remained elusive in most cases. 
 
State–business relations were still very important in this phase, as there was 
significant opposition to opening up by some firms, like HM in India. In the case of 
Egypt, liberalisation in the sector took place while making sure NASCO remained 
unaffected. However, pressure from a few politically connected non-productive firms 
was never going to be enough in the changing international political economic 
environment, which was increasingly being dominated by the WTO’s multilateralism 
or by regional trade agreements.  
 
Importantly, too, given the increased technological capability of other firms in the 
sector and the consequent productivity-led compulsions, many firms welcomed 
liberalisation. These firms, close to the competitiveness frontier, mostly existed as 
successful joint ventures, as in Turkey, or merged with foreign auto makers. In India, 
a parallel trend of successful indigenous auto firms, both in passenger cars and in 
commercial vehicles, was beginning to take shape. In all of these developments, 
industry associations played a key role in lobbying respective governments and this 
marked the move towards a formalisation of business–government relations in the 
sector. In South Africa, for example, the National Association of Automobile 
Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA), as a well established and powerful 
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federation, through its formal participation in policy processes remained influential 
within an overall trajectory of greater liberalisation. 
 
More recently, greater technological complexity and maturity have also led to 
significant changes in state–business relations and have meant that a level playing 
field is in the interest of all players. This is consistent with the fact that, as sectors 
mature in terms of technology and gain competitiveness, profits are made from 
 
Table 4: Summary of developments during the liberalisation phase  
  Policy measures 
undertaken 
Political economy Outcomes 
Egypt Some liberalisation, but 
also lack of long-term 
strategy. 
 
Attempts to restore 
protection in face of 
Euromed agreement. 
More influential role by 
elite business leaders.  
Egypt joins WTO in 
1995.  
 
Rearguard action by 
domestic interests.    
Failure to develop 
significant exports and 
limited FDI. 
 
Industry in weak 
position to compete 
with growing import 
competition.  
India High protection 
maintained, together 
with export support. 
Powerful domestic 
players emerge. 
Development of strong 
cluster with large-scale 
domestic and export 
production.  
South 
Africa  
Gradual phase down of 
tariffs, together with 
production and 
investment subsidies.  
Strong influence by 
NAAMSA, but within 
formal policy process 
parameters. 
High level of 
international integration 
and growing imports. 
Low levels of local 
content.  
Turkey Customs union with 
EU. 
Growing influence of 
MNCs.  
Integration into EU on 
favourable terms.  
 
participating in global or at least globally integrated markets. At low levels of 
technological capability, firms in emerging sectors require more discretionary rents to 
survive. As outlined earlier, the key is how much of this is used for productive 
purposes, even in situations where rent capture does take place. In essence, the 
total outcome is the significant statistic, not the magnitude of the rent or rent-seeking 
costs (Khan 2011). 
 
Hence state–business relations are still very significant, but have evolved into formal 
industry lobbying as the nature of the sector has changed in developing 
countries. Given that MNCs are also now part of the sectoral political economy in 
developing economies, the role of discretion is limited.  
 
Egypt: The liberalisation phase and attempts to restore protection. The opening 
up of the Egyptian economy to imports beginning after the turn of the century 
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coincided with a significant shift in Egypt’s political economy landscape, in which the 
private sector began to exert increased influence on the country’s political system. By 
the early 2000s, informal relationships between holders of political and economic 
power initially established in the 1970s under Sadat’s policy of economic 
liberalisation began to evolve and take the form of a more rules-based system, as a 
number of the country’s elite business leaders began to take on positions in Egypt’s 
political institutions. This transition to a system based on formalised relationships 
between business and politicians was led primarily by Gamal Mubarak, the son of the 
former president. In 2002, a new body within the ruling National Democratic Party 
(NDP), known as the Policies Committee (PC), was established, whose purpose was 
to manage and direct a new wave of fiscal and economic liberalisation reforms 
(Kandil, 2012). Most members of the PC rhetorically favoured economic liberalisation 
reforms.  
 
In 2004, Egypt also entered into the Euro Mediterranean Agreement (Euro-Med), a 
free trade agreement with the EU. The agreement stipulated gradual annual 
reductions in customs duties across a number of sectors. Customs duties on 
commercial and passenger vehicles being imported from the EU were scheduled to 
decline to zero by 2019. The agreement posed a clear threat to domestic assembly 
and would also undercut the sales of assemblers of non-European brand vehicles, 
including GB Auto, the Mansour Automotive Company and others.  
 
Foreseeing the threat of imported vehicles from drastic liberalisation, the government 
provided export subsidies via the Export Promotion Fund, starting in 2010. In 2014, 
the total export subsidy for car components was $19.6 million on exports of $270 
million, which accounted for 29 percent of total engineering sector export subsidies.4 
Support was also provided for worker training5 and supplier development. Exports 
grew, but only to a small share of total output.  
 
With the rapid reduction in tariffs, imports have risen rapidly. In 2004, 62 percent of 
the US$1,750 million worth of vehicles sold in the domestic market were imported, an 
increase from 52 percent just two years earlier. By 2013, and assisted by the 
appreciation of the Egyptian pound, imports reached 70 percent of all domestic sales.   
 
The prospect of zero tariffs by 2019 under the Euro-Med agreement posed a 
formidable challenge for Egypt. While many assemblers could reconstitute 
themselves as distributors in such a scenario, doing so would make them less 
profitable and would remove any remaining hope for the survival of the industry. In 
May 2015, Daimler, which produced Mercedes passenger vehicles, announced the 
withdrawal of its 26 percent stake in its local assembler, the Egyptian German 
 
4 Authors’ calculations, based on unpublished Engineering Export Council of Egypt (EEC-EG) 
data. 
5 Support was provided through the Industrial Modernisation Centre within the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, which is responsible for Egypt’s Industrial Development Strategy (Loewe, 
2013). 
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Automotive Company (EGAC), thereafter ceasing all local assembly operations in 
Egypt.6  Industry experts warn that other domestic assemblers could follow  
 
At the same time, an industry advocacy group known as the Egyptian Automotive 
Council, chaired by Chairman of the Bavarian Auto Group, Farid Al-Tobgi, was 
created to address the threat of reduced protection (Al-Boursa, 2015). Membership in 
the organisation includes many prominent assemblers and component suppliers.  
Among the proposals put forward by the industry was a new 30 percent tax on all 
imported vehicles, in addition to increasing lower-bound local content requirements 
for vehicles assembled domestically from 40 percent to 58 percent (Al-Ahram, 2015). 
This was finalised in the form of a new draft law submitted to the Ministry of Finance 
in September 2015. A further indication of this trend is that in 2014, Egypt did not 
implement the mandated 10 percent reduction in tariffs on vehicles imported from the 
European Union, following negotiations between the ministry and their EU 
counterparts.7 If the draft law is approved, it will create a series of new non-tariff 
trade barriers that would protect domestic Egyptian stakeholders against imports, 
undoing the effects of the tariff reductions implemented after 2004 and negating 
Egypt’s obligations in terms of the Euro-Med agreement. 
 
Another powerful non-tariff trade barrier introduced recently to protect the industry 
has been a policy of ‘indicative pricing’ – or, in simpler terms, arbitrary pricing – 
adopted by the Egyptian Customs Authority (ECA) in September 2014, and imposed 
on CBU vehicles imported specifically by German brands operating in Egypt. In the 
case of Egypt’s automotive sector, ‘indicative pricing’ has come to refer to instances 
in which the ECA has forced licensed Egyptian vehicle importers of CBUs to pay 
additional duties on vehicles being imported through customs. Victims of indicative 
pricing believe the policy is a means to offset the effects of the Euro-Med agreement, 
which, if implemented, would make CBU imports of German brands significantly 
more competitive and threaten the market share of a number of powerful domestic 
stakeholders, in particular local assemblers of both German vehicles and other 
foreign brands – such as the Korean Hyundai and American Chevrolet brands 
assembled and distributed by GB Auto and the Mansour Automotive company.  
 
Since 2004, Nissan has been the only fully foreign-owned automotive venture in 
Egypt. The limited amount of FDI has been aimed at meeting domestic demand, 
rather than using the country as a regional hub. This is the case despite the fact that 
Egypt is party to two other regional free-trade agreements in addition to the Euro-
Med agreement, namely the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA), joined in 
1997, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), joined in 
2000.  
 
 
6 Egypt Independent, 25 April 2015. 
7 Interview material, 31 October 2015. Ahmed Fekry Abdel Wahab, chairman and managing 
director of the FAW Industrial Group; board of directors, Engineering Export Council of Egypt. 
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India: Liberalisation of licensing requirements and the maturation of the sector. 
Between 1991 and 1993, the Indian government delicensed all automotive segments 
in the country and today the sector is open to 100 percent foreign ownership. By this 
time, Maruti had long overtaken HM and Premier and established itself as the leading 
vehicle manufacturer in the country. Maruti’s presence was key to ensuring India’s 
success in the sector post liberalisation. In addition, large-scale investments by 
Hyundai mirrored some of Maruti’s strategies related to its supplier base. This in turn 
was driven by India’s large and rapidly growing market, combined with high effective 
tariff rates and localisation policies. Importantly also, the years of protection had led 
to the emergence of technologically capable firms like Tata Motors, Mahindra and 
Mahindra, Bajaj, Eicher, TVS and Ashok Leyland. 
 
This reflects the fact that once a sector reaches relative maturity – and this is defined 
in terms of domestic competitiveness due to FDI or presence in the export market – 
competition becomes both compulsion and incentive (Roy 2013). The leading 
companies in the motorcycle (Hero) and commercial vehicle (Tata and Mahindra) 
markets are indigenous firms. The passenger car market is dominated by FDI, 
although the two Indian firms (Mahindra and Tata) rank third and fifth in market 
share. In the case of foreign manufacturers, auto makers like Nissan, Volkswagen, 
General Motors and Ford are using India’s relatively highly skilled but low-wage 
workers to produce small cars for export. 
 
Some of this is, of course, to do with the high duty structure on vehicles and lower 
component tariffs. The current tariff structure is skewed towards the OEM sector, 
though the employment generation possibilities of the auto component sector are 
high too. Indian firms in the auto component industry, like TVS, Sona, Rane, Bharat 
Forge and Motherson Sumi, were helped by the fact that India had significant local 
component requirements in the first few years after liberalisation. These first tier 
suppliers were able to make use of the protected markets and technology transfer 
from Korea and Japan, while also investing in their own capability development 
(Tewari, 2001; Aya and Siddharthan, 2007). For instance, by 2007, Hyundai was 
already sourcing 70 percent of its components from local suppliers in Tamil Nadu.  
 
Politicians from Tamil Nadu played a key role in attracting Hyundai, one of India’s 
biggest auto investments, to the state. By the time Hyundai was investing in India in 
the late 1990s, the Congress party that was responsible for the Suzuki investment 
was in opposition. An industry minister hailing from Tamil Nadu and part of the new 
coalition government was instrumental in attracting Hyundai, an arch rival of Suzuki 
in the small car (800 to 1000 cc) market.  
 
The minister saw Suzuki as a beneficiary of Congress largesse and therefore used 
the opportunity to provide Hyundai with incentives that would ensure it invested in 
Tamil Nadu. It certainly helped that the state already had a developed auto and auto 
components sector. Training and upskilling were other key reasons why the Indian 
auto and auto component industry were successful in attracting FDI and in this, 
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industry associations, especially the Confederation of Indian Industry, played a 
critical role.   
 
More recent policies introduced by governments recognise the technological 
complexity of the sector globally. The first national-level policy package for the sector 
was announced in 2002. In 2006, the then Indian government launched the Indian 
Auto Mission Plan (IAMP), under which it launched programmes like the National 
Automotive Testing and R&D Infrastructure Project (NATRIP) to support the auto 
industry in making India a global hub for the sector. NATRIP provides international 
standard testing and homologation facilities for the Indian automobile industry.   
 
The current government has also provided a slew of incentives for ‘green’ cars, 
though the market is as yet very limited in India. NATRIP could prove to be exactly 
the sort of policy measure the sector now needs at the higher end of the auto value 
chain. At the other end, however, India’s auto component makers are now finding it 
very difficult to achieve cost efficiencies, because of the lack of skills among second- 
and third-tier suppliers. Given that most firms in this segment are in the highly 
fragmented unorganised sector, their bargaining power with ruling coalitions is lower 
than that of the large auto firms. As a result, their ability to politically bargain for 
productivity enhancing rents is limited. 
 
The auto sector has a mix of both MNCs and local producers and there is a fairly 
high level of export competitiveness among both foreign and local players. As a 
result, the auto sector is now one of India’s ‘sunrise’ industries and has evolved into a 
formal rule following sector in the conventional sense.  
South Africa: Growing international integration and problems of supply chain 
development. Until the early 1990s, high protection resulted in very low volumes of 
vehicle imports. With the liberalisation that began in earnest with the introduction of 
the MIDP, total imports of vehicles and components have grown at a more rapid rate 
than policy makers expected, rising from $4.5 billion in 1995 to $11.9 in 2015 (AIEC, 
2016). The nominal tariff on light vehicles, at 25 percent, was still reasonably high 
and does not on its own explain the rapid increase in automotive imports. The key 
factor was that the MIDP enabled firms to rebate import duties by exporting.  
Vehicle producers were happy to accept reductions in tariffs from very high levels, 
but initially registered growing concerns about proposed reductions below 40 
percent. But they derived a growing proportion of their revenue from the importation 
of vehicles (and components) and much of the strategic behaviour of firms was, 
therefore, directed at optimising their duty position. This was reflected in their firm-
level strategies, as well as interventions to influence government, where they sought 
to ensure that mechanisms which allowed them to rebate duties based on exporting 
were only phased down very slowly. From 1996 to 2011, the average level of duty 
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paid by vehicle manufacturers was only 0.6 percent of the total value of their imports 
of vehicles and components over this period.8 
The growth of automotive exports has been one of the most striking features of the 
development of the automotive industry under the MIDP. At the inception of the MIDP 
in 1995, they amounted to $1.2 billion and by 2015 had reached $12.4 billion. It is 
clear that the MIDP’s incentive structure strongly favoured exports. But the very 
strong supply response to changes in the policy regime is also partly attributable to 
the nature of the automotive industry value chain. Since 1994, there was a process of 
investment or reinvestment by MNCs and all seven light vehicle producers9 are now 
100 percent foreign owned. At least one of the factors driving the takeover of 
domestically owned plants by licensees was the need to upgrade the South African 
plants in the face of growing competition. To achieve scale, exports were essential 
and this was unlikely to happen from licensed, as opposed to wholly owned, plants.  
The MNCs were able to rapidly facilitate exports, either from their own South African 
operations or from South African-based suppliers, to their international operations. 
This enabled them in turn not only to expand their own exports, but also to offset 
import duties on cars and parts. While trade and industrial policy have provided 
significant support, especially for exports, there have also been substantial 
improvements in productivity. However, this still lags behind countries such as 
Thailand in terms of manufacturing costs (Barnes et al., 2017).  
A highly contested issue in the development of the automotive sector, both in South 
Africa and other developing countries, has been the level of local content in 
domestically assembled vehicles. Government has been keen to promote greater 
depth of supply chain development by securing investment in first- and second-tier 
suppliers and this was one of the stated objectives of the Automotive Production and 
Development Programme (APDP), which replaced the MIDP in 2013. The bargaining 
power of the MNCs ensured that it remained relatively easy to import vehicles and 
parts into the South African market while offsetting almost all duties (Barnes et al., 
2014). The recently developed 2035 Masterplan sets the ambitious objective of 60 
percent local content, a substantial increase on current level of under 40 percent. It 
remains to be seen how this can be achieved in a policy environment which provides 
little protection for the component sector.   
In real terms, there has only been a modest increase in investment in vehicle 
manufacture, apart from the boom in 2005-2006. However, a potentially significant 
development has been the investment  by Beijing Automobile International 
Corporation (BAIC) building a new assembly plant in the Eastern Cape. 10  An 
interesting aspect is that South Africa’s state-owned Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC) will have a significant share in the venture. This will make BAIC 
the only light vehicle producer with some local ownership. The reasons for this are 
 
8 Calculated from unpublished customs data.  
9 These are Toyota, Nissan, VW, Mercedes, BMW, Ford and GM. The latter has recently sold 
its plant to Isuzu.   
10 See Arnoli (2018). 
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not yet clear, although it is probably seen by the investor as a way of ensuring 
government cooperation. The South African government has increasingly been 
pressing for (local) black ownership in the sector, in terms of its Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) policy. This has so far been strong resisted by 
multinational vehicle producers, which have suggested alternative measures, 
including black ownership in the supply chain.  
Turkey: The customs union with the EU and its impact. The customs union (CU) 
agreement between Turkey and the EU that went into effect in 1996 was a critical 
turning point in the Turkish policymaking process (Togan, 2000). The agreement 
limited the power of domestic interest groups to influence the trade policy and forced 
domestic vehicle producers to fully integrate their production units with global 
automotive supply chains.  
There was of course significant opposition to the implementation of the CU. Labour 
unions claimed it would lead to job losses in many sectors, but their political power 
had been weakened by the labour laws that were enacted after the 1980 coup. The 
automotive industry lobbied strongly against it, but once they realised that there was 
no way they could block the agreement, they argued that the tariff phase down 
should be phased. The industry was, therefore, listed as a ‘sensitive’ sector, subject 
to a five-year transition period, during which the tariffs on imports from third countries 
would be significantly higher than the EU average customs tariffs on cars imported 
from third countries (which was fixed at 10 percent). In addition, and perhaps more 
importantly, the Turkish government secured the agreement with the EU to block 
imports of used cars from the EU for 10 years.  
 
Nevertheless, it was clear that the models introduced in the first half of 1990s would 
not be able to compete with high quality cars imported with very low tariffs. The 
vehicle producers responded by increasing investment, which rose from $220 million 
in 1996 to $650 million in 2001 and $1370 million in 2014. Installed capacity 
increased steadily, from 300,000 units in 1984 to nearly 1.8 million units in 2015, with 
production reaching 1.4 million units in that year. 
 
In the mid-1990s, with the imminent prospect of the CU agreement with the EU, 
Japanese and Korean companies (Honda, Hyundai, and Toyota) started investing in 
Turkey in joint ventures with Turkish industrialists or, as in the case of Isuzu, 
expanding existing joint ventures.11  Currently, six passenger car producers have 
foreign participation, four of which are majority foreign-owned.12 There are eight other 
companies (two of them foreign-owned) producing trucks, pickups, buses, minibuses 
and tractors. Thus, the automotive industry has become dominated by subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations. The sector has also benefited from the existence of a 
strong domestic industrial and supplier base (Wasti et al., 2006). The component 
industry remains dominated by smaller domestic firms, and the majority of these 
 
11  Of these four MNCs, Toyota and Honda decided to become the sole owners of their 
production units (and Hyundai increased its share to 70 percent) once they decided to target 
their production towards the European market rather than the domestic market.  
12  Home countries: EU (2), Japan (2), United States (1), and Korea (1). 
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have not been integrated into global value chains. But there has also been 
substantial inward investment, mainly taking the form of joint ventures, by major 
component MNCs such as Robert Bosch, Valeo, Delphi Packard, and Mannesmann 
Sachs.  
Turkey has offered significant incentives for R&D and the automotive industry has 
been one of the leading industries in responding to these incentives. While initially 
their R&D efforts mostly focused on simple development activities, over time, as 
engineers gained more experience, many automotive firms moved part of their 
international design activities to Turkey.  By 2014, the automotive industry accounted 
for 18.9 percent of total R&D expenditures undertaken by the Turkish private sector. 
Two leading automotive manufacturing companies, Ford Otomotiv and Tofas, 
employed 1,512 and 700 employees, respectively, in their R&D centres. 
 
Comparative analysis. An analysis of the liberalisation phase of the auto industry in 
our case study countries suggests that, for the most part, the industry was able to 
weather trade integration, but at the cost of giving up on creating an indigenous auto 
sector. India remained an exception, largely because the sector liberalised much 
later than the others, allowing for significant scope for learning under protection. Its 
very large domestic market was also a contributing factor.  
In the case of the other countries, liberalisation wrought significant changes too. In 
Turkey, joint ventures between well connected and productive local players and 
globally powerful MNCs were the response to the CU. In South Africa, the domestic 
industry became completely dominated by MNCs. In Egypt, however, the sector, 
despite protection even in a liberalised regime, was marked by stagnating 
productivity, largely as a result of adverse state–business relationships in the sector, 
together with economic and political instability. Decades of protectionism, which has 
been neither performance-based nor finite, have left the country’s automotive sector 
under-developed and largely incapable of competing internationally. The recent 
success of Morocco in establishing a large export-oriented auto industry in north 
Africa provides a telling contrast.   
What the analysis in this section clearly outlines is how, despite having similar 
protectionist policies, the trajectories of the auto sectors in each of the case study 
countries have varied greatly. India and Turkey have performed better than South 
Africa and Egypt in this regard, with India perhaps the most successful of the four, 
given that it has a sizeable and successful indigenous auto sector. Success in the 
contemporary phase is partly contingent on how rents were disciplined in the first 
phase, rather than simply on the policies of protection themselves.  
 
What seems significant is the presence of a strong productive domestic lobby, in the 
case of both Turkey and India, which mobilised for protection in order to upgrade 
their technological capabilities. In Egypt so far, evidence seems to suggest that 
domestic players have mobilised often to protect their interests, but have not used 
this opportunity to improve competitiveness. The South African case seems to fall 
somewhere in between. MNCs had lobbied in their interests, for instance to limit any 
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need to raise local content. Turkey asked for and got substantial protection from the 
government in terms of imports of second hand cars and a ‘holiday’ in terms of 
lowering tariffs before joining the CU. The Indian government still does not allow 
import of used cars and duties on vehicles remain high. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The common thread running through all our comparator countries is a history of 
protection followed by greater openness to investment and imports. All countries had 
accorded priority status to the sector and have therefore tried to maintain some 
protection and at the same time develop exports. This paper, therefore, represents a 
comparative study of the management and enforcement of rents and how this 
process helped, or hindered, the process of integrating into the highly globalised 
contemporary auto sector.  
 
The development of indigenous capability is, in large part, a result of the initial rent 
management capabilities of the ruling coalition. Where the distribution of power 
between the ruling coalition and capitalists was such that the rents were used for 
learning and developing capability, for instance in Turkey, India and South Africa in 
varying degrees, local industry developed. In Egypt’s case, the sector was 
characterised by capture, where, despite long periods of protection, the sector has 
not become globally competitive. And the Euro-Med free trade agreement is unlikely 
to bring any benefits to the sector, given that further integration will make survival 
difficult for many firms.  
 
In all our cases, firms were producing at well below optimal scale and using outdated 
technology to manufacture inferior products. Because optimal scale is nearly always 
large in comparison to domestic market size, exports have been absolutely critical. 
And once domestic industries had accumulated skills and capabilities, they required 
significant foreign investments in competition with other locations. The state has had 
to balance the interests of vehicle assemblers and component suppliers, for instance 
by seeking to maximise local content, but at the same time ensure access by 
assemblers to components at world prices. Maintaining policy stability and certainty 
has been important, as has the maintenance of a suitable investment climate, 
including skills and infrastructure.  
 
Of course, country-specific conditions and market size are important factors. India’s 
large and dynamic market virtually ensures large-scale inward investment and has 
also allowed it to maintain relatively high levels of tariff protection, while developing a 
competitive industry. Turkey’s physical location adjacent to the EU and sizeable 
market has made it an attractive location for investment. South Africa has the 
disadvantage of being remote from major markets and Egypt’s small domestic 
market is not particularly attractive to MNCs.     
 
However, the size of the market assumes critical importance only after local 
capability and competitiveness have developed enough for foreign firms to enter. And 
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even if the size of the market is small, countries can still access foreign markets. 
South Korea had a small domestic market, but used disciplining to achieve 
competitiveness in foreign markets. Nothing changed in the size of India's domestic 
market in 1980, when Suzuki invested in India. And even in the liberalisation phase 
of the1990s, India’s per capita income and the size of the middle class population 
were not high enough to warrant high levels of FDI in the sector. But, given that a 
competitive industry had developed thanks to capability development in the 
protectionist years (auto components in Tamil Nadu, etc.), and later Maruti Suzuki, 
the sector became competitive enough to produce at low costs with competitive 
quality.  
 
The development of a home sector in the initial protectionist phase becomes even 
more critical if we are to take the case of an indigenous auto sector as a benchmark 
of success in the sector. Only India and China (among late developers) have so far 
managed this, though India’s import intensity is higher in the sector. Mexico, Brazil, 
Turkey and Thailand have successful auto sectors, but with almost no input from 
local OEMs, though in Turkey powerful local firms have joint ventures with MNCs. 
This has to do with the particular political settlements (enforcement capability) in 
each country, which allowed rents to be disciplined in very different ways or not. 
Malaysia might have succeeded with the Proton, but Mahathir's rent management 
capabilities were weak and the project never became competitive. 
 
Of course, markets matter for a small country and it can be difficult to develop an 
auto sector with a small market. However, Slovakia, Morocco and Poland buck that 
trend, as they are adjacent to major markets. But, equally, historical disciplining 
mattered for capability development too. Hence markets become key in order to grow 
the sector, once initial capability has been established. In fact the trajectory then 
becomes self-fulfilling. 
 
Of all our case studies, Egypt was least able to develop such capabilities. The 
automotive industry in Egypt has a long history of protection, but was unable to 
establish significant scale or a strong supplier industry. Liberalisation took place 
without any coherent policy to promote exports and in a market which, while growing 
rapidly, remained small in international terms. Not surprisingly, assemblers and 
component and suppliers are seeking protection for themselves, in the form of more 
stringent local content requirements and additional import taxes on CBU vehicles. 
Protection might buy the domestic sector time to upgrade the quality of their 
products. However, the domination of the industry by a few powerful individual firms 
with extensive political connections has meant that there is little compulsion to 
develop into a competitive industry. 
 
India was an unlikely candidate to be successful in auto making, given the disastrous 
early history of the sector. Learning rents were captured by politically powerful firms 
and the infant industry did not grow up. Despite this, pockets of capability were 
developed in this period of dirigiste growth which could be leveraged by indigenous 
firms as the sector gradually liberalised. Technology transfer from Japanese (and 
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later Korean) firms played a big role in developing the sector. However, the structure 
of the rents in the later period was such that they did not make demands on the 
enforcement capability of the state. Firms, especially indigenous ones, had become 
competitive enough to use them to close the competitiveness gap with the frontier, 
rather than capture them. Challenges still exist for the sector, as the next growth 
spurt has to be delivered from the high value added segment of R&D and the labour-
intensive, but equally critical, segment of second- and third-tier component 
manufacturers.   
 
South Africa has been only partially successful in restructuring its automotive industry 
in terms of its own national objectives. Economic theory would attribute growing 
exports by multinational corporations from a developing economy, such as South 
Africa, to efficiency-seeking FDI targeted at taking advantage of the comparatively 
low-cost structure of the developing economy. Yet this was patently not the case and 
the boom in exports evident over the period of the MIDP was largely driven by the 
import-export complementation scheme, and hence by the strategic intent of 
exporting firms to earn sufficient import credits to offset their duty exposure in the 
domestic market. This does not mean that the South African automotive industry did 
not improve its competitiveness under the MIDP. The evidence is unequivocal in this 
regard. However, modest rates of investment and relatively low local content are 
revealing about the long-term strategy of firms and indicate that the country has not 
fully established itself as a competitive regional production hub.   
 
The development of the Turkish economy since the early 1990s shows that, despite 
the macroeconomic policies and conditions inhibiting investment and growth, certain 
industries like auto have performed very well. This is largely because the country has 
had a long experience of production in the automotive industry and this helped 
develop a strong supplier base during the import-substituting industrialisation era of 
the 1960s and 1970s. It also seized the opportunities opened up by the CU, by 
investing in new product and process technology. Both the final product and supplier 
segments of the industry are well organised, and have established a shared vision of 
the future through organised dialogue within the industry and with the public sector 
as well.  
Early growth in the auto sector in our four case countries was enabled by a specific 
configuration of mostly discretionary business–government relationships that were 
characterised by rents from protected markets. However, where these rents were 
used for productive purposes and the sector became globally competitive, MNCs 
were attracted to them, both for markets and in the search for competitive suppliers. 
As this evolution took place, the sector started becoming characterised more by rule 
following behaviour and formal state–business relationships manifested through 
industry associations and lobbying for sectoral incentives, as opposed to firm-specific 
ones. Even here, the push for more or less openness has been driven by the 
composition of the auto sector. In the case of Turkey and India, domestic firms still 
have enough leverage to dictate some of the terms in the sector. However, given the 
current architecture under the WTO, and the already mature and complex technology 
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of the sector, breaking into the increasingly concentrated industry is becoming more 
difficult for newly emerging producer countries. 
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Appendix 1: Exchange rates with US dollar 2000-2016 
 
 Official exchange rate per US$, annual average 
 
Egyptian 
pound 
Indian 
rupee 
South 
African  
rand 
Turkish 
lira 
2000 3.47 44.94 6.94 0.63 
2001 3.97 47.19 8.61 1.23 
2002 4.50 48.61 10.54 1.51 
2003 5.85 46.58 7.56 1.50 
2004 6.20 45.32 6.46 1.43 
2005 5.78 44.10 6.36 1.34 
2006 5.73 45.31 6.77 1.43 
2007 5.64 41.35 7.05 1.30 
2008 5.43 43.51 8.26 1.30 
2009 5.54 48.41 8.47 1.55 
2010 5.62 45.73 7.32 1.50 
2011 5.93 46.67 7.26 1.67 
2012 6.06 53.44 8.21 1.80 
2013 6.87 58.60 9.66 1.90 
2014 7.08 61.03 10.84 2.19 
2015 7.69 64.15 12.75 2.72 
2016 10.03 67.20 14.71 3.02 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
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